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Abstract
One simple way to endogenize the degree of cross ownership in an industry
is that rms give away part of their prots. We show that this possibility of
unilaterally giving prots away to the rival previous to Bertrand competition
opens the door to multiple equilibria. In the symmetric duopoly with con-
stant marginal costs any price between the cost and the monopolistic price
can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus, tacit collusion in
the one shot game can be achieved. Further, any market share can also be
sustained for any equilibrium price. These results are extended to more than
two rms and to asymmetric costs.
JEL classication: L12.
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t sharing; oligopoly; collusion; cross ownership; Bertrand.
1 Introduction
The present paper studies the consequences of introducing a new strategy
in a Bertrand oligopoly with homogenous goods that consists on unilaterally
and voluntarily giving a part of own prots to rivals previous to the Bertrand
game. Thus, in a rst stage, rms decide simultaneously what part of their
prots to give away to their rival and then, in a second stage, they choose a
price in a standard Bertrand competition. Notice that the action of giving
away prots is decided unilaterally and unconditionally in a non-cooperative
framework. After the decision to give prots is done, the giving rm is
commited to it.
Ferreira andWaddles (2010) explore this strategy in a general setting, and
apply it to both Cournot and Bertrand competition with heterogenous goods.
They show that the strategy is more likely to allow for tacit collusion when
choice variables are strategic complements and when monopolistic prots are
big compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium in the oligopoly. In fact,
they nd that for Bertrand competition with goods with low heterogeneity
some degree of tacit collusion is possible. However, their methodology re-
lies on the di¤erentiability of the prots functions, and cannot be applied to
Bertrand competition with homogenous goods. The special characteristics
of the Bertrand model, with a discontinuous prots function, and the qual-
itatively di¤erent results we nd, call for the separate analysis presented in
this work.
By adding a stage of prot sharing to the Bertrand model, we show
that rms may be able to support prices between the marginal cost and the
monopoly price, thus obtaining positive prots in almost all of the equilib-
ria. This remarkable result, that resembles a Folk theorem, is robust to the
number of rms and to cost asymmetries. Furthermore, for a given equi-
librium price, any share of the market can also be supported in a subgame
perfect equilibrium. For the duopoly case we completely characterize the set
of pure strategy equilibria. However, in the extension to more than two rms,
and due to the increasing complication in the multiplicity of equilibria, we
only show the existence of the equilibria in the subgames that is su¢ cient to
support the desired equilibrium price.
One may be tempted to argue that the result is not surprising. To put it
in Reitmans words (Reitman, 94):
To take the simplest example, suppose symmetric Cournot duopolists
each own 50% of the prots from its competitors product. In
choosing its own strategy, each rms objective will be to maxi-
mize the sum of the two rmsprots, and will choose the collusive
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output level in equilibrium.
However, this intuition is misleading, as one has to check that the individ-
ual incentives make this situation, the choice of sharing a 50% of the rivals
prots, an equilibrium. In Ferreira and Waddles (2010) we already showed
that this is the case only in some scenarios.
The e¤ects of cross ownership on competition has been explored at least
since the work by Reynolds and Snapp (1986), where it is shown that cross
ownership serves to internalize free rider problems associated with policing
collusion. Since then, other authors have worked out many related issues. For
example, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) study a one-way cross ownership model
where a big rm wants to acquire assets from another rm. Throughout a
single-period Cournot oligopoly model, they show that, as the degree of cross
ownership among rivals increases, the equilibrium in the market becomes less
competitive.
In a dynamic setting, Malueg (1992) shows that, if rms interact repeat-
edly, increasing cross ownership may reduce the likelihood of collusion. A
high level of cross ownership may even entail a lower likelihood of collusion
than no-cross-ownership would. Gilo et al. (2006) explore this issue with
more detail to show that, in general, the incentives to tacitly collude depend
in a complex way on the entire partial cross ownership.
More related to our work, Reitman (1994) considers an oligopolistic model
with conjectural variations in which rms buy claims to prots of other rms,
and nd that in the more rivalrous competition (i.e., more than Cournot),
rms are willing to form partial ownership agreements to take advantage of a
reduced competition. Later on, Alley (1997) develops a conjectural variation
model that allows for partial ownership arrangements to the Japanese and US
automobile industries to study the degrees of competitiveness and collusion
in both countries.
Other recent works include Jackson and Wilkie (2005), that characterize
the outcomes of games when players can make binding o¤ers of strategy-
contingent side payments before the game is played.
All these works, except Reitman (1994), have in common the exogeneity
of the degree of cross-ownership. In our work, by contrast, this is endoge-
nously determined in the model. In Reitman (1994), the cross ownership is
decided in a mechanism in which rms buy claims to other rmsprots. In
practice, this price need not be a cash payment, but any sort of contribu-
tion to production, marketing, etc., that does not a¤ect the variable costs of
production. There are two main di¤erences with our model. First, we show
that there is no need for this cash payment, and, second, that the choice of
how much of the prots to share does not need to be part of an agreement
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betwenn two rms, as we only need that the level of prot sharing be de-
cided by the giving rm. Remarkably, we observe the same kind of results
(the willingness to share prots is higher if the competition is stronger) with
these di¤erences in the model in our companion work (Ferreira and Waddles,
2010). This willingness takes the highest level in the Bertrand case, analized
in the present work.
This way, our work also contributes to the literature that views the
Bertrand model as paradoxical, as it predicts perfect competition when there
are only two rms in the market. Some authors have strongly criticized the
Bertrand model pointing out its lack of realism. For instance, they think
that it could be improved by relaxing some of its crucial assumptions like
the timing of the game or the perfect substitutability of products. Others
have attempted to nd out a solution that ts to the real world. For exam-
ple, Edgeworth (1897) solved it by introducing the elegant idea of capacity
constraints, by which rms cannot sell more than they are able to produce.
Later, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) treated capacities as endogenous deci-
sions previous to price competition, and showed that the new model leads to
Cournot outcomes.
One of the problems in Kreps and Scheinkman is that, for some capacity
choices, the only equilibria are in mixed strategies, which are not uniformly
accepted as a satisfactory explanation of pricing behavior by oligopoly rms1.
After all, in a mixed strategy equilibrium, rms can regret ex post their deci-
sions, and, since prices can easily be changed, the stability of the equilibrium
may be called into question2. In our model, every price in the range is ob-
tained in a pure strategy equilibria and, thus, is immune to this criticism.
The innite repetition of the Bertrand competition o¤ers another way out
of the paradox, as the Folk Theorem states that, for su¢ ciently high discount
rates, any price between the cost and the monopoly price can be attained
in a subgame perfect equilibrium and also that any market share among the
di¤erent rms can be obtained. We obtain the same result without the need
of repetition.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we present the analysis for the stan-
dard Bertrand model with equal marginal costs. Section 3 modies the model
to allow rms to have di¤erent marginal costs. Section 4 generalizes the
previous models to n rms with equal marginal costs and to n rms with
asymmetric costs. Section 5 concludes.
1See Shapiro (1989) and Maggi (1996).
2In a more recent work Moreno and Ubeda (2006) are able to provide a more elegant
model in which the equilibria exist in pure strategies. Their model uses the capacity
and price choices of each rm to construct a supply function game, in which, again, the
Cournot outcome is obtained in equilibrium.
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2 Prot sharing in a Bertrand duopoly
Consider two rms, 1 and 2; that compete a la Bertrand in a homogeneous
market, and that each rm incurs a cost c 2 [0; 1) per unit of production.
Let the market demand function be q = D(p) = 1 p, and assume that rms
do not have capacity constraints, and always supply the demand they face.
The (before sharing) prot function for Firm i is:
i =
8<:
(pi   c)(1  pi) if pi < pj
1
2
(pi   c)(1  pi) if pi = pj
0 if pi > pj
i; j = 1; 2 (i 6= j)
Consider now the following two-stage game of prot-sharing. In the rst
stage Firm i (i = 1; 2)chooses i, the proportion of prots i that Firm
i gives to Firm j (6= i). In the second stage, Firm i selects price pi after
observing the choices in the previous stage. Prots after sharing are given
by Pi = (1  i)i + jj: We will be interested in nding the set of prices
that can be supported in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in this market.
So far, the prot-giving strategy has been performed directly. However,
in real life, this strategy may be hidden behind a more complicated relation.
To see this, consider the following simple case of a joint venture.
Let i 2 [0; 1] denote the part of its own prots that Firm i is willing
to invest in a joint venture along with Firm j. The total investment in
the joint venture is, then, given by 11 + 22. We will assume a simple
joint venture activity with net prots given by F = k (11 + 22) where
k > 0. Finally, we assume that each rm receives siF , where si =
i
i+j
:
Consequently, we can write the new prot function of each rm as Pi =
(1  i)i + sik
 
ii + jj

or Pi = [1  (1  sik)i] i + sikjj.
It is now straightforward to see that (1   sik)i plays the role of i,
and sikj the role of j in the previous model, and that conditions on i
and i can be translated as conditions on i; j and on k for the prot-
giving strategy to be protable in equilibrium3. As far as we know, only
Reynolds and Snapp (1986) make a connection between cross ownership and
joint ventures, although, in their case, the connection is made to show an
incentive to investing in entry deterrence strategies.
2.1 The second stage
To nd a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), we begin by nding
the set of pure strategies Nash equilibria in the second-stage. Although for
3For instance, condition 1 + 2 below is satised for 1 = 2 =
1
4 and any k.
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the purposes of nding equilibria that supports the di¤erent prices it is not
necessary to nd all the equilibria in these subgames, we do it for its own
interest and for the sake of completeness. In a series of lemmata, we nd
all equilibria in pure strategies for all subgames in the second stage. Then
we summarize our ndings in Proposition 5. In what follows, denote the
monopoly price by pm.
Lemma 1 The price conguration (p1; p2) s.t. p1 = p2 = c, is an equilibrium
for any (1; 2).
Proof. The proof is straightforward, as unilateral deviations result in
zero or negative prots.
Lemma 2 The price conguration (p1; p2) s.t. c < p1 = p2 = p  pm is
never an equilibrium for any (1; 2) such that 1 + 2 6= 1: In the case
p > pm there is no equilibrium with p1 = p2 if 1 + 2 < 1:
Proof. The expressions for prots before and after sharing take the forms
i =
1
2
(p  c) (1  p), and Pi = 12 (1  i + j) (p  c) (1  p) :
First, if 1 + 2 > 1, Player i has an incentive to deviate from pi = p to
p0i > p, leaving all the market to Firm j. Prots after this deviation are, then,
P 0i = j (p  c) (1  p) : Clearly, P 0i > Pi as long as j > 12 (1  i + j) ; or,
equivalently, 1 + 2 > 1:
Second, if 1 + 2 < 1, Player i has an incentive to deviate from pi = p
to p0i < p  " if p  pm, and to p0i = pm if p > pm: In both cases, if takes the
whole market to itself.
If p  pm; prots after the deviation are given by P 0i = (1  i) (p0i   c) (1  p0i) ;
which can be made arbitrarily close to
sup
p0i<p
P 0i = (1  i) (p  c) (1  p) = P supi :
One can see that P supi > Pi as long as 1   i > 12 (1  i + j), or
1 + 2 < 1:
If p > pm Firm i can deviate to pi = pm and obtain Pmi = (1  i) (pm   c) (1  pm) :
Clearly, Pmi > P
sup
i > Pi if 1 + 2 < 1:
The next lemma is the key to our results. It shows that, for some cong-
uration of prot shares, any price between the cost and the monopoly price
may be sustained in an equilibrium where both rms set the same price, and
thus share the market equally. Since they also share prots, the incentives are
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conicting. The perspectives after deviating to a lower price must balance
the increase in (1   i)i with the decrease in jj. Similarly, a deviation
to a higher price must balance the decrease in (1   i)i with the increase
in jj. These balances make the existence of an equilibrium with p > c
possible if 1 + 2 = 1.
Lemma 3 Prices (p1; p2) s.t. p1 = p2 = p 2 [c; pm] are equilibria for (1; 2)
such that 1 + 2 = 1.
Proof. Lemma 1 proves the case for p1 = p2 = c. Suppose, then, that
p 2 (c; pm], and that Firm i sets a price p0i below p and above c, then prots
after the deviation are 0i = (1  p0i) (p0i   c)  0, 0j = 0; and
P 0i = (1  i)0i = (1  i) (1  p0i) (p0i   c) :
The supp0i P
0
i = P
sup
i = (1  i) (1  p0i) (p0i   c), the best deviation, is
achieved at p0i = p as long as p  pm. To avoid a protable deviation, we
need P supi  Pi, or (1  i)  12 (1  i + j), which gives
1 + 2  1: (1)
Similarly, for any price p00i > p, we have
00
i = 0 and
00
j = (1  pj) (pj   c) >
0
P 00i = j
00
j = j (1  pj) (pj   c) = j (1  p) (p  c) :
To avoid a protable deviation, we need P 00i  Pi, or j  12 (1  i + j),
which implies
1 + 2  1: (2)
Inequalities (1) and (2) represent the non-deviation conditions, and both
are satised when 1 + 2 = 1.
The next lemma completes the set of equilibria that one can nd using
pure strategies. It shows the possibility of equilibria with di¤erent prices.
The following notation will be useful for the next statements: (p) = (1  
p)(p  c). I.e., (p) denotes the total prots in the market if rms set price
p.
Lemma 4 The only cases in which (p1; p2) s.t. pi 6= pj constitute an equi-
librium are given by the conditions 1 + 2  1 and pi = pm <
_
p  pj for
_
pj
satisfying (p
m)
(
_
p)
>
j
1 i :
6
The strategy of the proof is similar to that in Lemma 3. However the
conditions are more complicated. It should be clear that, if pi < pj  pm,
Firm i could set a price closer to pj and increase (1 i)i without changing
jj = 0; thus increasing Pi. If pi = pm < pj, things are more complicated.
Certainly, the deviation to set pi closer to pj, but still under it, will not work.
However, it could be the case that Firm i wants Firm j to have all the market
(or part of it) to take advantage of the increase in jj. We need to nd the
conditions to ensure that this deviation does not work. The details of the
proof are left to the Appendix.
The next proposition summarizes the Nash equilibria in pure strategies
that can be found in the subgames after the choice of (1; 2) :
Proposition 5 The Bertrand game with a prot-sharing previous stage has
the following pure strategy Nash equilibria in the subgames:
(a) If 1 + 2 = 1, then the equilibria are (p1; p2) s.t. p1 = p2 = p 2 [c;
pm] or pi = pm <
_
p  pj for
_
p satisfying (p
m)
(
_
p)
=
j
1 i .
(b) If 1 + 2 > 1, then the equilibria are (p1; p2) s.t. p1 = p2 = c or
pi = p
m <
_
pj  pj for
_
pj satisfying
(pm)
(
_
p)
>
j
1 i :
(c) If 1 + 2 < 1, then the equilibrium is (p1; p2) s.t. p1 = p2 = c:
2.2 The whole game
The next proposition shows that any price between perfect competition and
monopoly can be achieved, yielding positive prots to the industry.
Proposition 6 Any price pair (p1; p

2) such that c  p1 = p2 = p  pm can
be sustained in a SPNE. Further, for the cases c < p1 = p

2 = p
  pm the
SPNE implies that, in the rst stage the shares (1; 

2) satisfy 

1 + 

2 = 1:
Proof. Consider the following strategy. In the rst step players play
(1; 

2) such that 

1 + 

2 = 1: In the second stage they play (p

1; p

2) such
that c  p1 = p2 = p  pm if 1 + 2 = 1, and p1 = p2 = c otherwise.
Since the prices constitute Nash equilibria in the respective subgames,
it remains to check that there are no protable deviations for the rms in
the rst stage. This is straightforward, as any deviation in the rst period
has the consequence that 1 + 2 6= 1 and, therefore, in the second period,
the equilibrium implies p1 = p2 = c and zero prots. Thus, no deviation is
protable.
Proposition 6 has the avor of a Folk Theorem, even if it deals with a one
shot game. If rms follow the tacit agreement to share prots in a certain
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way in the rst stage, they get a high price in the second. If they do not,
they get zero.
Intuitively, it does not seem surprising that 1 = 2 = 12 results in
monopolistic prots, as both rms control half of the prots of the rival,
and that each one of them has the same objective function as a monopolist.
However, this intuition does not take into account the entire story. On the
one hand, having half the prots of the rival, and giving away half of the
own, provides the incentive not to undercut the rival, but this also occurs
at any other price. On the other hand, a price below pm does not provide
incentives to unilaterally increase the price, as it would if the rm behaved
as a monopolist. This is because this action will not a¤ect the total market
prots, as the other rm gets the whole market.
The other interesting aspect of Proposition 6 comes from the fact that
this same argument applies whenever 1 + 2 = 1. For instance, if Firm 1
gives as little as a 10% of its prots to Firm 2, then, it needs to receive 90%
of Firm 2s prots in the equilibrium. This results in Firm 1 having 90% of
total market prots. Thus, Proposition 6 not only says that any price may be
sustained in a SPNE, but also that any nal market share can be sustained.
3 Asymmetric costs
We consider the same model as in the previous section except that we allow
Firm 1 and Firm 2 to have di¤erent marginal costs (assume that c1 < c2 < pm1 ,
where pm1 is the monopolist price of Firm 1), and that we let Firm 1 supply the
entire market whenever its price is less or equal to Firm 2s price. This last
condition is the natural one to impose due to the e¤ects of the discontinuity
of the prots function on the equilibrium if we do otherwise. If the rm with
the lowest cost does not get all the market when both set price p1 = p2 = c2,
Firm 1 will set a price slightly below c2, but since the best response is not
well dened, the situation (p1 = c2  "; p2 = c2) could not be an equilibrium.
However, those prices constitute a perfectly good equilibrium if all quantities
must be multiples of ". To impose the rule that the rm with the lowest
cost gets all the market if prices are the same saves the equilibrium in the
continuous case. Then, the prot of each rm is:
1 =

(p1   c1)(1  p1) if p1  p2
0 otherwise
2 =

(p2   c2)(1  p2) if p2 < p1
0 otherwise
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Lemma 7 The price conguration (p1; p2) s.t. p1 = p2 = c2, is an equilib-
rium for any (1; 2).
Proof. The proof is straightforward, as a deviation to set a smaller price
by Firm 1 (resp., Firm 2) clearly implies smaller prots for Firm 1 (resp.,
losses for Firm 2). Likewise, if Firm 1 sets a higher price, Firm 2 takes all
the market, it which it makes zero prots. Firm 2 does not change anything
by increasing its price.
Lemma 8 next is the counterpart of Lemma 3, and it shows the possibility
of multiple equilibria. As it was the case in Lemma 3, the key is to nd
conditions in (1; 2) to balance the changes in both (1   i)i and jj
after a deviation in order for that deviation not to be protable. The most
interesting part of the lemma is the fact that the conditions in (1; 2) are
less restrictive than in the case of symmetric rms.
In the sequel, pmi will denote the monopoly price when costs are ci.
Lemma 8 If 2
1 1 
pm1  c1
pm1  c2 and
1 2
1
 pm1  c1
pm1  c2 , then p1 = p2 = p 2 (c2; p
m
1 ]
are equilibrium prices.
If 2
1 1 
pm1  c1
pm1  c2 or
1 2
1
 pm1  c1
pm1  c2 , then the following prices constitute an
equilibrium in the subgame, p1 = p2 = p 2 (c2; pm1 ] such that 21 1 
p c1
p c2
and 1 2
1
 p c1
p c2 :
Proof. Consider a situation in which p1 = p2 = p, where prots are given
by P1 = (1  1) (p  c1) (1  p) and P2 = 1 (p  c1) (1  p)
i) Suppose that Firm 1 sets a price p01 above p2 (by setting p
0
1 < p2 we
have that 1 decreases while 2 remains unchanged, so that no improvement
in payo¤s can be expected), then 01 = 0 and 2 = (p  c2) (1  p)  0, and
P 01 = 22 = 2 (p  c2) (1  p)
To avoid a protable deviation, we need P 01  P1, or 2 (p  c2) 
(1  1) (p  c1), which gives
2
1  1 
p  c1
p  c2 (3)
Let us study the deviation for Firm 2
ii) Suppose that Firm 2 sets a price p02 below p1 (setting p
0
2 > p1 changes
nothing), then 1 = 0 and 
0
2 = (p
0
2   c2) (1  p02)  0, and
P
0
2 = (1  2)02 = (1  2) (p02   c2) (1  p02)
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The supp02 P
0
2 = P
sup
2 = (1  2) (p02   c2) (1  p02) (the best deviation) is
achieved at p02 = p as long as p  pm2 (pm2 is the Firm 2 monopoly price).
To avoid a protable deviation, we need P sup2  P2, or (1  2) (p  c2) 
1 (p  c1), which gives
1  2
1
 p  c1
p  c2 (4)
Inequalities (3) and (4) represent the non-deviation conditions, and both
are satised when
2
1  1 
p  c1
p  c2 and
1  2
1
 p  c1
p  c2 :
The statements of the proposition follow once one realizes that p
m
1  c1
pm1  c2 
p c1
p c2 <1 for all p 2 (c2; pm1 ].
Lemma 9 There is no equilibrium with p1 = p2 > pm1 .
Proof. Consider (p1; p2) s.t. p1 = p2 = p > pm1 . In this case, P1 =
(1  1) (p  c1) (1  p), which can be increased with deviation p01 = pm:
Finally, Lemma 10 completes the search for equilibria in pure strategies
showing the equilibria in which rms set di¤erent prices. The proof is left to
the Appendix.
Lemma 10 The necessary and su¢ cient condition for an equilibrium with
di¤erent prices is 1 2
1
 pm1  c1
pm1  c2 , and the possible equilibria are given by the
pairs (p1; p2) s.t. c2 < p1 = pm1 <
_
p2  p2 for
_
p2 satisfying
(pm1 )
(
_
p2)
> 2
1 1 .
The next proposition summarizes our ndings about equilibria in the
second stage of the two asymmetric rms case.
Proposition 11 The Bertrand game with a prot-sharing previous stage and
costs c1 < c2 has the following pure strategy Nash equilibria in the subgames:
(a) If 2
1 1 
pm1  c1
pm1  c2 or
1 2
1
 pm1  c1
pm1  c2 , then the equilibria with equal prices
are (p1; p2) s.t. p1 = p2 = p 2 [c2; pm1 ] and 21 1 
p c1
p c2 and
1 2
1
 p c1
p c2 :
(b) If 2
1 1 
pm1  c1
pm1  c2 and
1 2
1
 pm1  c1
pm1  c2 , then the equilibria with equal prices
are (p1; p2) s.t. p1 = p2 = p 2 [c2; pm1 ].
(c) If 1 2
1
 pm1  c1
pm1  c2 , then the equilibria with di¤erent prices are (p1; p2)
s.t. c2 < p1 = pm1 <
_
p2  p2 for
_
p2 satisfying
(pm1 )
(
_
p2)
> 2
1 1 : If
1 2
1
>
pm1  c1
pm1  c2
there are no equilibria with di¤erent prices.
10
The next proposition is the counterpart of Proposition 6 and shows that,
with di¤erent costs, it is also possible to support multiple market prices in a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In this case, any price between the cost
of the least competitive rm and the monopoly price of the most competitive
one can be found in a SPNE.
Proposition 12 Any price pair (p1; p

2) such that c2  p1 = p2 = p  pm1
can be sustained in a SPNE.
Proof. The proposition is trivial for p = c2, so we only provide the
proof for the other cases.
Consider the following strategy. In the rst step players play (1; 

2) such
that 

1
1 2 
p c1
p c2 ,
1 2
1
 p c1
p c2 and 

1 < 1   (c2 c1)(1 c2)(p c1)(1 p) : In the second
stage they play (p1; p2) = (p1; p

2) if in the rst stage (1; 2) = (

1; 

2),
and p1 = p2 = c2 otherwise. Notice that the conditions are satised for
1 + 

2 = 1 and any p
 2 (c2; pm1 ]:
Since the prices constitute Nash equilibria in the respective subgames,
we need to check that there are no protable deviations for the rms in
the rst stage Prots in equilibrium are P1 = (1  1) (p   c1) (1  p) and
P2 = 1 (p
   c1) (1  p).
If Firm 1 deviates to 01 6= 1 it triggers a subgame in which it gets P 01 =
(1  01) (c2   c1) (1  c2). Given this continuation, the best deviation is 01 =
0; with P
0
1(
0
1 = 0) = (c2   c1) (1  c2) : The deviation is not protable if
P
0
1(
0
1 = 0)  P1, something that must be the case for 1 < 1  (c2 c1)(1 c2)(p c1)(1 p)
as (p   c1) (1  p) > (c2   c1) (1  c2) whenever c2 < p  pm1 .
Finally, deviations by Firm 2 can only give this rm smaller prots,
as price in out of equilibrium subgames is p = c2, which implies P 02 =
1 (c2   c1) (1  c2)  P2:
Let p
 c1
p c2 = t. Clearly t > 1, thus conditions
1
1 2 
p c1
p c2 and
2
1 1 
p c1
p c2 are satised if
1
t
1 + 

2  1 and 1 + 1t2  1, which are satised
for all 1 + 

2  1 and for some values such that 1 + 2 > 1: Also, notice
that the restriction that 1 be small enough is more restrictive the lower
the equilibrium price one wants to support. In particular it is enough that
1  1  (c2 c1)(1 c2)(p c1)(1 p) . Thus, the margins for a prot sharing equilibrium are
quite broad.
The fact that we do not have the equivalent to the symmetric case condi-
tion 1 + 

2  1 is due to the specic tie breaking rule, that favors the rm
with the lowest cost with the whole market, and thus deviations by the rm
with the highest cost are not particularly important. In fact, one can prove
that the rule that divides the market equally if prices are the same cannot
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support this kind of equilibria. However, tie breaking rules that assign a
proportion of the market higher than 1
2
but less than 1 to the low cost rm
can still support prices between c2 and pm1 .
4 Extension to n rms
4.1 Equal costs
In this section, we consider n rms indexed by i 2 N = f1; 2; :::ng in a
homogeneous market. We suppose that each rm incurs a cost c per unit
of production. The market demand function is q = D(p) = 1   p. We
assume that rms do not have capacity constraints and always supply the
demand they face. For a given vector of price choices (p1; :::; pn), consider
pmin = minfp1; :::; png, and dene N 0 as N 0 = fi 2 N : pi = pming, and let
n0 = cardN 0. Therefore, the prot function of Firm i can be written as:
i =
8<:
(pi   c)(1  pi) if pi < pj 8j 6= i
1
n0 (pi   c)(1  pi) if pi = minfp1; :::; png
0 otherwise
Let ij denote the part of the prot that Firm i shares with rm j. We
suppose that ij 2 (0; 1) and
Pn
j=1 ij = 1. Consequently, we can write the
new prot function Pi of each rm as:
Pi = iii +
Pn
j=1(j 6=i) jij:
As before, we consider a two-stage game whose sequences are thus dened.
In the rst stage of the game, Firm i chooses (i1; :::; in), while in the second
stage of the game, it selects pi.
To nd the complete set of equilibria in all subgames becomes a com-
plicated, tedious exercise as the number of rms increase. However, we can
still prove the existence of a SPNE to support any price between c and the
monopoly price.
Proposition 13 Any price vector (p1; :::; p

n) such that c  pi = p  pm1
for all i 2 N can be sustained in a SPNE. Further, the equilibrium requires
that rms share prots to satisfy
nX
j=1(j 6=i)
ij +
1
n  1
nX
j=1(j 6=i)
ji = 1 for all i 2 N: (5)
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The proof is similar to that in propositions 5 and 6 and can be found in
the Appendix. Condition (5) is the generalization of the condition 1+

2 = 1
for the case of two symmetric rms. Notice that it satised for ij =
1
n
for
all i; j 2 N .
4.2 Di¤erent costs
Order rms according to costs, so that c1  c2  :::  cn; let N1 be the set
of the rms with the lowest cost, i.e., N1 = fi 2 N : ci = c1g; and denote by
n1 the cardinal of N1: Now the prot function is:
i =
8<:
(pi   ci)(1  pi) if pi < pj 8j 6= i
1
n0 (pi   ci)(1  pi) if pi = minfp1; :::; png
0 otherwise
Now we can state our last proposition for the general case of n rms and
asymmetric costs.
Proposition 14 Any price p s.t. c  p  pm1 , where c = c1 if n1 > 1, and
c = c2 if n1 = 1, and where pm1 is the monopoly price of Firm 1, can be
supported in a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies.
The formal proof is given in the Appendix, but a sketch can be presented
as follows. If n1 > 1; the idea is to share the market among the rms with
the lowest cost (rms with ci = c1) in a similar fashion as in Proposition 13.
The other rms choose not to share prots and set price equal their marginal
costs. If n1 = 1, however, the market will be shared among Firm 1 and the
rms with the next-to-lowest costs (rms with ci = c2) in a way similar to
that in Proposition 12, with the added feature that now we can have more
than one rm with a higher cost. Thus, conditions in Proposition 12 must
be adapted to this possibility. The general arguments, however, still hold.
5 Conclusion
We considered Bertrand oligopolies with homogeneous goods, linear demand
and constant marginal costs, and found that it is possible to support equi-
librium prices above marginal costs by introducing a previous stage of prot
sharing. In this stage, rms voluntarily and independently of each other
decide how much of their prots they will give away to rivals.
The range of prices that can be supported in a subgame perfect equilib-
rium varies between the second lowest marginal cost and the monopoly price
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of the lowest cost rm. Further, there is also a great range of the nal mar-
ket shares (after counting the e¤ects of prot sharing) that can be supported
in equilibrium, thus making the range of possible payo¤s similar to those
provided by the Folk theorem in a repeated game.
Ferreira and Waddle (2010) analyzed the strategic-prot-sharing strategy
in oligopolistic scenarios with di¤erentiable payo¤ functions. In that work it
was shown that the strategy was more likely to facilitate some degree of tacit
collusion the higher the strategic complementarity of second stage game, and
the higher the di¤erences between monopoly and oligopoly equilibria. Both
conditions are satised in the present model. However, as nothing could be
shown in general about the extend of the degree of collusion, if any, a separate
analysis was necessary.
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Appendix
Proofs.
Lemma 4.
Proof. Without lost of generality, let (pi; pj) be such that c  pi < pj.
Then
Pi = (1  i)i = (1  i) (pi   c) (1  pi), and
Pj = ii = i (pi   c) (1  pi) :
Since prices pi and pj are di¤erent, we have to study separately the de-
viations for each rm. Let us check rst Firm j. We will consider pi  pm
since, otherwise, Firm i will deviate to a lower price. If c = pi prots by
Firm i can increase by increasing pi. Consider, then that c < pi and rst
check for deviations by Firm j:
i) If Firm j sets a price p0j below pi, its new prots are given by P
0
j =
(1  j)0j = (1  j) (p0j   c)(1   p0j): The supP 0j is achieved at p0j = pi,
with P 0j(p
0
j = pi) = (1  j)i: Thus, to avoid a protable deviation, we
need Pj = ii  P 0j = (1  j)i, which implies 1 + 2  1:
ii) If Firm j sets a price p00j equal to pi, then 
00
i = 
00
j =
1
2
(p00j c)(1 p00j ) =
1
2
i > 0, with P 00j =
1
2
(1  j + i)i: To avoid a protable deviation, we
need Pj = ii  P 00j = 12 (1  j + i)i, which implies 1 + 2  1, as
before.
Now, let us check deviations for Firm i.
i0) Suppose that Firm i deviates to set a price p0i above pi and below pj,
then P 0i = (1  i) (p0i   c) (1  p0i) = (1  i)0i: This kind of deviation is
protable as long as pi < pm. Thus, a necessary condition for Firm i not to
be willing to deviate is pi  pm. If pi > pm; a deviation with p0i slightly below
pi will be protable. Hence, the equilibrium requires pi = pm:
ii0) Suppose, then, that pi = pm; and that Firm i considers a deviation
to set its price p00i > pj (any other deviation below pj is clearly unprotable),
then 00i = 0 and 
00
j = (pj   c) (1  pj), with P 00i = j00j . For the deviation
not to be protable we need Pi = (1  i)m  P 00i = j00j , which implies
(pm)
 (pj)
 j
1  i : (6)
iii0) Suppose that pi = pm; and that Firm i considers a deviation to
set its price p000i = pj: Now 
000
i = 
000
j =
1
2
(pj   c) (1  pj), and P 000i =
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1
2
(1  j + i)(pj): To avoid a protable deviation, we need Pi = (1  i)m 
P 000i =
1
2
(1  i + j)(pj); which implies
m
(pj)
 1  i + j
2 (1  i) : (7)
A deviation to a price pivi < pj is clearly unproductive. Inequalities (6)
and (7) are satised for all pj 
_
p if they are satised for
_
p. Of them, (6) is
more restrictive and, therefore, both are satised for all pj 
_
p such that
(pm)

 _
p
  j
1  i
is satised, which provides the condition for the equilibrium.
Lemma 10.
Proof. Let (p1; p2) such that c2  p1 < p2. Then1 = (p1   c1) (1  p1) >
0 and 2 = 0;with
P1 = (1  1)1 = (1  1) (p1   c1) (1  p1), and
P2 = 11 = 1 (p1   c1) (1  p1)
Since prices p1 and p2 are di¤erent, we have to study separately the
deviation for each rm. Let us check rst Firm 2. We will consider p1  pm1
since, otherwise, Firm 1 will deviate to a lower price.
i) If Firm 2 sets a price p02 below p1 (other deviations are trivially shown
not to provide higher prots), its new prots are given by P 02 = (1  2)02 =
(1  2) (p02   c2) (1  p02) : The supP 02 is achieved at p02 = p1, with P 02(p02 =
p1) = (1  2) (p1   c2) (1  p1) : Thus, to avoid a protable deviation, we
need P2 = 1 (p1   c1) (1  p1)  P 02 = (1  2) (p1   c2) (1  p1), which
implies
1  2
1
 p1   c1
p1   c2 : (8)
Now, let us check for Firm 1.
i) Suppose that Firm 1 deviates to set a price p01 above p1 and below p2,
then P 01 = (1  1) (p01   c) (1  p01) = (1  1)01: This kind of deviation is
protable as long as p1 < pm1 . Thus, a necessary condition for Firm 1 not
to be willing to deviate is p1  pm1 . If p1 > pm1 ; a deviation with p01 slightly
below p1 will be protable. Hence, the equilibrium requires p1 = pm1 ; and
condition (8) becomes
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1  2
1
 p
m
1   c1
pm1   c2
:
ii) Suppose, then, that p1 = pm1 ; and that Firm i considers a deviation to
set its price p001 above p2 (any other deviation below p2 is clearly unprotable),
then 001 = 0 and 2 = (p2   c2) (1  p2), with P 001 = 22. For the deviation
not to be protable we need P1 = (1  1) (pm1 )  P 001 = 12, which
implies
(pm1 )

  _
p2
  2
1  1 (9)
The above inequality provides the condition for the equilibrium. It will
be satised if p2 is set so high that D (p2) = 0:
Now, it remains to show that there are no other equilibrium prices if
1 2
1
 pm1  c1
pm1  c2 . To that e¤ect, let us consider (p1; p2) such that p1 < p2 and
p1 < p
m
1 . In this case, Firm 1 would set a price p
000
1 greater than p1, but
lower than p2 to get a prot P 0001 = (1  1)0001 (p0001 ; p2), which is greater than
(1  1)1(p1; p2) as long as p0001 < pm1 . If p1 > pm1 , the protable deviation
occurs with a price p0001 < p1.
Proposition 13.
Proof. First we start by specifying the equilibria in the subgames. It
is straightforward to see that, in every subgame, the price vector (p1; :::; pn)
s.t. p1 = :::pn = c constitutes an equilibrium. Next we nd equilibrium
prices above the cost. The prots of Firm i (i = 1; :::; n) in a situation in
which c < p1 = ::: = pn = p  pm are i = 1n (p  c) (1  p) and Pi =
1 Pnj=1(j 6=i) iji +Pnj=1(j 6=i) jij or
Pi =
1
n

1 Pnj=1(j 6=i) ij +Pnj=1(j 6=i) ji (p  c) (1  p)
Let us study possible deviations by Firm i.
i) Suppose that Firm i deviates to a price p0i < p , then
0
i = (1  p0i) (p0i   c) >
0 and j = 0, and
P 0i = (1 
Pn
j=1(j 6=i) ij
0
i) =

1 Pnj=1(j 6=i) ij (1  p0i) (p0i   c)
Since p  pm; the best deviation provides at most
supp0i<p P
0
i = P
sup
i =

1 Pnj=1(j 6=i) ij (1  p) (p  c) :
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Therefore, to avoid a possible deviation we need P supi  Pi, which im-
plies

1 Pnj=1(j 6=i) ij  1n 1 Pnj=1(j 6=i) ij +Pnj=1(j 6=i) ji, and that
is satised if
(n  1)
nX
j=1(j 6=i)
ij +
nX
j=1(j 6=i)
ji  n  1 for all i 2 N (10)
ii) Suppose that Firm i sets a price p00i > p thenj =
1
n 1 (1  p) (p  c) >
0 and 00i = 0, with
P 00i =
Pn
j=1(j 6=i) jij =
1
n 1
Pn
j=1(j 6=i) ji (1  p) (p  c).
To avoid a possible deviation we need P 00i  Pi, implying 1n 1
Pn
j=1(j 6=i) ji 
1
n

1 Pnj=1(j 6=i) ij +Pnj=1(j 6=i) ji, which is satised if
(n  1)
nX
j=1(j 6=i)
ij +
nX
j=1(j 6=i)
ji  n  1 (11)
Inequalities (10) and (11) represent the non-deviation conditions and both
are satised when
nX
j=1(j 6=i)
ij +
1
n  1
nX
j=1(j 6=i)
ji = 1: (12)
The proof is complete by making rms choose ij = 

ij; where (

ij)i;j
satises (12), in the rst stage, and (p1; :::; p

n) such that c  pi = p  pm1 if
(ij)i;j was indeed chosen in the rst stage, and p

i = c otherwise.
Proposition 14.
Proof. First we start by nding subgames in which the di¤erent prices are
equilibria. To this end, start by nding the expression for Pi, in a situation
in which cn < pi = p  pm1 for all i 2 N . Prots in this situation are given
by
i =
1
n1
(p  c1) (1  p) for all i 2 N1,
i = 0 for all i =2 N1;
Pi =

1 Pnj=1(j 6=i) iji +Pn1j=1(j 6=i) jij
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= 1
n1
(1 Pnj=1(j 6=i) ij +Pn1j=1(j 6=i) ji) (p  c1) (1  p) for all i 2 N1,
and
Pi =
1
n1
(
Pn1
j=1(j 6=i) ji) (p  c1) (1  p) for all i =2 N1:
Now we can consider deviations from this point.
(i) Case 1: n1 > 1; i 2 n1, deviation to p0i < p.
The consequence is 0i = (p  c1) (1  p), while 0j = 0 for all j 6= i. Since
p  pm1 = pi, its maximum new prots P 0i will be computed as
supp0i<p P
0
i = P
sup
i =

1 Pnj=1(j 6=i) ij (p  c1) (1  p) :
To get P supi  Pi we need
1 Pnj=1(j 6=i) ij  1n1 (1 Pnj=1(j 6=i) ij) + (Pn1j=1(j 6=i) ji), or
nX
j=1(j 6=i)
ij +
1
n1   1
n1X
j=1(j 6=i)
ji  1: (13)
(ii) Case 2: n1 > 1; i 2 N1, deviation to p00i > p.
The new prots are 00i = 0; 
00
j =
1
n1
(p  c1) (1  p) for all j 2 N1 n fig;
and 00j = 0 for all j =2 N1: This gives
P 00i =
1
n1 1(
Pn0
j=1(j 6=i) ji) (p  c1) (1  p) :
In order for the deviation not to be protable we need P 00i  Pi :
1
n1 1
Pn1
j=1(j 6=i) ji  1n1

1 Pnj=1(j 6=i) ij +Pn1j=1(j 6=i) ji, or
nX
j=1(j 6=i)
ij +
1
n1   1
n1X
j=1(j 6=i)
ji  1: (14)
Conditions (13) and (14) are satised when
nX
j=1(j 6=i)
ij +
1
n1   1
n1X
j=1(j 6=i)
ji = 1 for all i 2 n1: (15)
(iii) Case 3: n1 = 1; in which case N1 = f1g, and the deviation of i 2 N1
is the deviation of Firm 1. In this case P1 = (1 
Pn
j=2 1j) (p  c1) (1  p) :
Consider p01 < p.
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With this deviation 01  1, and 0j = j = 0 for all j 6= i, with
P 01 = (1  
Pn
j=2 ij) (p
0
1   c1) (1  p01). The consequence is P 01  P1 as long
as p  pm1 :
(iv) Case 4: n1 = 1; deviation by Firm 1 to p01 > p.
After this deviation, the market will be shared among the rms with costs
at the level of Firm 2, c2: Denote this set of rms by N2; i.e., N2 = fi 2 N :
ci = c2g; n2 will denote the cardinal of N2 Prots are 0i = 1n2 (p  c2) (1  p)
for all i 2 N2; and 0i = 0 for all i =2 N2: Prots of Firm 1 are
P 01 =
1
n2
(
Pn2+1
j=2 j1) (p  c2) (1  p) :
The deviation is not protable if
1
n2
(
Pn2+1
j=2 j1) (p  c2) (1  p)  (1 
Pn
j=2 1j) (p  c1) (1  p), or
1
n2
(
Pn2+1
j=2 j1)
1 Pnj=2 1j  p  c1p  c2 : (16)
(v) Case 5: n1 = 1, deviations by i 6= 1.
A deviation to a higher price changes nothing, so consider p0i < p, with
the e¤ect that 0i = (p
0
i   ci) (1  p0i), and 0j = j = 0 for all j 6= 1. Then
supp0i<p P
0
i = P
sup
i =

1 Pnj=1(j 6=i) ij (p  ci) (1  p) :
The deviation is not protable if P supi  Pi = 1i (p  c1) (1  p)
1 Pnj=1(j 6=i) ij (p  ci) (1  p)  1i (p  c1) (1  p) ; or
1 Pnj=1(j 6=i) ij
1i
 p  c1
p  ci for all i 6= 1: (17)
Condition (17) is the counterpart of condition (12) for the case of n rms
with equal costs, and is satised if ij =
1
n
for all i; j 2 N , while conditions
(15) and (16) are the counterpart of conditions (3) and (4) for two rms with
di¤erent costs, and they are satised whenever 1
n2
(
Pn2+1
j=2 j1)+
Pn
j=2 1j  1,
and
Pn
j=1(j 6=i) ij+1i  1 for all i 6= 1, as p c1p ci  1, which in turn are satised
if ij are small enough.
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To support a price p 2 (ci; ci+1] with ci < ci+1, one can set pj = p for
all j such that cj  ci+1, and pj = cj: In this case, rms with a cost higher
than ci+1 do not receive or give any prots. This way, the new game is as
the one before with rms with the highest costs are out of it, and we can the
argument above.
The price p = c1 if n1 > 1 or p = c2 if n1 = 1 is supported straightforward.
Finally, to show the SPNE in the whole game, proceed as follows. Choose
a price p s.t. c  p  pm1 , nd the conditions on (ij(p))ij for which the price
p can sustained in equilibrium. We just made sure that such conditions exist.
Now the equilibrium is as follows
(a) in stage 1, choose (ij(p))ij,
(b) if n1 > 1; in stage 2 choose pi = p if (ij)ij = (ij(p))ij, and pi = ci
otherwise for all i 2 N or
(c) if n1 = 1; in stage 2 choose pi = p if (ij)ij = (ij(p))ij, and pi =
maxfc2; cig for all i 2 N
If n1 > 1 Firms in N1 do not deviate to a di¤erent ij as that will imply
zero prots in the second stage.
If n1 = 1; Firm 1 will not be willing to deviate if 1j is small enough.
The best deviation implies not to share prots with any rival, thus getting
P 01 = (c2   c1) (1  c2) in the second stage,which is lower than P1 = (1  Pn
j=2 1j) (p  c1) (1  p) if 1j are small enough as p > c2:
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